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We study dual agency in residential real estate, where the same agent/agency represents 
both the buyer and seller. We assess the extent to which dual agency suffers from  an 
inherent conflict of interest,  where the dual agent furthers the interest of one client at the 
expense of the other client’s, as well as principal-agent incentive misalignment where the 
agent furthers her own interest at the expense of one or both clients. And, we examine 
how these incentive conflicts affect agent behavior and transaction outcomes. To do so, 
we analyze 10,891 residential real estate transactions in Long Island, NY, from 2004-
2007. Specifically, we (i) identify how dual agency is correlated with house prices and 
time-to-sale,  (ii)  describe  and  assess  agent  behaviors  that  could  generate  these 
correlations, and (iii) provide some intuition as to the economic effects of prohibiting 
dual  agency  in  real  estate  transactions. We  find that  the  incidence  of  dual  agency is 
uncorrelated with sale price and negatively correlated with time-to-sale. However, on 
very fast deals, list prices and sale prices are significantly higher on houses sold via dual 
agency. These findings are consistent with first-resort selling (agents first showing houses 
to in-house buyer clients) and strategic pricing (agents inducing their seller clients to set a 
higher list price in anticipation of an internal client agreeing to it) on some deals, in 
conjunction with agents leaning on sellers to accept a lower sale price on other deals. 
First-resort selling is indicative of incentive misalignment, while the latter two behaviors 
reflect a  conflict  of  interest:  strategic pricing  transfers  surplus  from  the buyer  to  the 
seller, and leaning on the seller transfers surplus from the seller to the buyer. Further, our 
results  indicate  little  difference  between  dual-agent  (same  agent)  and  within-agency 
(same agency, but different agent) deals. Our findings provide some evidence of distorted 
outcomes associated with dual agency, mainly on fast deals, but the evidence indicates 
mild overall effects, suggesting that prohibiting the practice is not likely to substantially 
increase welfare.  
JEL codes: K21 (antitrust law), L41 (horizontal anticompetitive practices), L42 - Vertical 
Restraints, L85 (industry studies of real estate services) 
                                                 
∗ Vrinda Kadiyali is at Johnson School of Management, Cornell University.  Jeffrey Prince and Daniel 
Simon  are  at  Applied  Economics  and  Management,  Cornell  University.  They  can  be  reached  at 
kadiyali@cornell.edu, jtp35@cornell.edu, and dhs29@cornell.edu.  The authors thank Ellie Cohn, Fred 
Meyer, Aaron Moss, David Simon, and Michael Waldman for very helpful discussions, Cornell’s Applied 
Microeconomics workshop participants and the Johnson School Dean’s Research Lunch participants for 
comments, Norman Mendolsohn for data, and Lars Backstrom for research assistance.   Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019069
  2   
1.  Introduction 
In  this paper,  we  assess  the  consequences  of  allowing  for  dual agency  in the 
residential real estate market. We compare two important transaction outcomes – the sale 
price and length of time-to-sale – across two different types of transaction outcomes, 
dual-agency and cross-agency deals. We analyze data from 10,891 completed residential 
real estate transactions in Long Island, New York, during the time period 2004-2007. 
New  York  state  laws  permit  dual  agency  as  long  as  the  agent(cy)  discloses  its  dual 
representation to both parties. We attempt to determine whether the welfare consequences 
of dual agency ultimately warrant prohibiting this practice. Importantly, we differentiate 
between the inherent conflict of interest that arises in dual agency, where the dual agent 
compromises the interest of one client for the other client’s, and standard principal-agent 
incentive misalignment, where the agent compromises the interest of one or both clients 
to further her own interest
1. While conflict of interest is, itself, a subclass of principal-
agent issues (i.e. the dual agent does not serve the interest of one client), we differentiate 
between the two because legal and market responses to dual agency have focused on 
resolving  the  conflict  of  interest  issues  while  ignoring  the  agent-client  incentive 
misalignment.   
Researchers have examined conditions under which conflicts of interest might 
arise, how much harm can result, whether there are conditions under which a conflict of 
interest is an acceptable trade-off, and whether regulation might prove useful. In some 
markets, this practice is prohibited or avoided by firms. Examples include mergers and 
acquisition advisory services of investment banks where these banks do not advise both 
the target and acquirer in any deal, and law firms who do not represent both sides of a 
lawsuit. The most obvious reason to prohibit dual agency in any industry is the apparent 
conflict of interest it creates for the dual agent (agency) where it appears that the zero-
sum nature of transactions make it impossible for the dual agent to fulfill their duties to 
both clients impartially. However, Mehran and Stulz (2007) point out that the findings 
                                                 
1  We prefer to use the longer term “principal-agent incentive misalignment” rather than agency issues to 
avoid confusion with the term “agency” used to refer to the real-estate firm or agent representing the buyer 
or seller client. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019069
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from the empirical literature on conflict of interest in the financial services industry “are 
more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and 
politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence.” 
In  the  residential  real  estate  market,  at  least  in  regard  to  the  sale  price,  the 
interests  of  the  buyer  and  seller  appear  diametrically  opposed,  making  a  conflict  of 
interest seem obvious: If the agent helps the buyer obtain a lower price, this hurts the 
seller, and vice versa.  In addition to the inherent conflict of interest, the incentives of 
agents  and  their  clients  may  become  misaligned  in  other  ways  when  dual  agency  is 
allowed. For example, agents may steer their buyer clients to internal sellers to increase 
the chance of a dual-agency deal. The conflict of interest and principal-agent incentive 
misalignment issues in dual agency can result in economic harm to buyers and sellers, 
and even a net loss in welfare. However, despite the apparent conflict of interest and 
possible incentive misalignment, prohibiting the practice might not be desirable. Dual 
agency  might  provide  transactional  efficiencies  and  allow  for  quicker,  more  efficient 
matches, as well as expand the choices of houses and agents available for transactions. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the consequences of dual agency in this industry. 
 Consider  existing  research  in  the  area  of  dual  agency  in  real  estate  markets. 
Gardiner et al. (2007) examine the effect of a law change in Hawaii in 1984 requiring full 
disclosure of dual agency. The authors find that dual agency reduced the sale price, but 
the  effect  was  much  smaller  after  full  disclosure  of  dual  agency  was  required  by 
legislation (8.0 versus 1.4%). In addition, dual agency reduced the time to sale by about 
8.5% pre-legislation and 8.1% post-legislation. Evans and Kolbe (2005) look at the effect 
of dual agency on price appreciation (the ratio of the sale price to the purchase price) for 
houses that are first bought and then sold. They find that dual agency in the purchase 
transaction has no impact on price appreciation.  They also find very limited evidence 
that dual agency in the sale transaction has a negative effect on price appreciation.  
Our paper differs from these earlier papers on dual agency in several important 
ways. First, in addition to the inherent conflict of interest that arises in dual agency, we 
also argue that, independent of the conflict of interest associated with representing both   4   
sides in the transaction, the incentives of agents and their clients may become misaligned 
when dual agency is allowed. In doing so, we view the occurrence of a dual-agency deal 
as the outcome of a search-and-negotiation game between buyers and sellers, and their 
agents. Dual agency distorts agent incentives in both stages of this game, by offering 
private benefits for agents, resulting in agent behaviors which increase the likelihood of 
dual agency and affect the price and speed of transactions.  
Second, we try to empirically identify unobservable agent behaviors that both 
increase the likelihood that a house is sold via dual agency and that affect the price and 
speed of transactions. To do so, we compare transaction outcomes (sale price and time-
to-sale) in dual-agency and cross-agency deals, using the incidence of dual agency as a 
proxy for the effect of these underlying, unobservable agent behaviors. Although dual 
agency  is  also  a  transaction  outcome,  like  sale  price  and  time-to-sale,  we  treat  the 
incidence of dual agency differently in our empirical analysis. Specifically, we first try to 
understand whether there is any systematic correlation between the incidence of dual 
agency and the other two outcome variables (sale price and time-to-sale) and then ask 
what  unobserved  dual  agency  behaviors  could  explain  the  relationships  we  find.  We 
conduct  a  series  of  additional  analyses  in  an  effort  to  parse  out  the  effects  of  these 
behaviors. We then delineate the effects of these behaviors on both the search process for 
buyers and sellers, as well as for the negotiation process between buyers and sellers. By 
doing so, we can determine if and how conflict of interest and agent-client incentive 
misalignment  are  distorting  agent  behaviors  and  transaction  outcomes  in  dual-agency 
deals.  Therefore,  we  can  assess  whether  prohibiting  dual  agency  will  have  any 
meaningful impact on welfare. While the absence of a natural experiment (data from a 
state before and after dual agency was prohibited) prevents us from identifying the causal 
effect of dual agency, our approach allows us to assess the effects of the agent behaviors 
which affect the incidence of dual agency and transaction outcomes. 
Third, to better compare transaction outcomes in dual-agency and cross-agency 
deals, we exploit detailed information about the houses sold, as well as information about 
the agents involved.  We control for an extensive set of house characteristics, as well as   5   
the list price of the house.  In addition, we include fixed effects to control for unobserved 
agency, agent, and zip code-year effects. Prior studies of dual agency do not include these 
fixed  effects,  nor  do  they  control  for  the  list  price  or  the  extensive  list  of  house 
characteristics  that  we  include
2.    Including  these  controls  is  important  to  properly 
compare transaction outcomes in dual-agency and cross-agency deals.  
Lastly, while other papers have not made this distinction, in our empirical models 
we distinguish two types of dual  agency: Dual-agent deals, in which the same agent 
represents both buyer and seller; and within-agency deals, in which two separate agents 
working for the same agency represent the buyer and seller. This distinction is important 
because the incentives for being a dual agent might be different than those for doing 
within-agency  deals.  Moreover,  this  also  has policy  implications because  some  states 
allow within-agency deals but not dual-agent deals.   
In our initial analysis, we find three main results: Sale prices are the same in dual-
agency and in cross-agency deals (when we do not condition on list price); list prices are 
higher in dual-agency deals than in cross-agency deals (resulting in a negative correlation 
between dual agency and sale price, conditional on list price); and dual-agency deals 
close faster than cross-agency deals. Specifically, we find that list prices are about one 
percent higher on dual-agency deals, while houses sold via dual-agency deals sell about 
seven percent (six days) faster than houses sold via cross-agency deals. 
We describe one type of agent behavior, first-resort selling, which is consistent 
with  all  three  results.  In  first-resort  selling,  agents  routinely  show  houses  to  internal 
clients before external clients. Because agents show houses to internal buyers first, the 
incidence of dual agency should be disproportionately high on very fast deals, where the 
house  is  sold  before  being  shown  to  the  external  market.    Therefore,  we  conduct 
additional analysis focusing on very fast deals (deals that close quickly), which provides 
additional  evidence  consistent  with  first-resort  selling.  This  analysis  also  provides 
evidence  consistent  with  two  other  agent  behaviors  that  could  jointly  explain  these 
                                                 
2 Gardiner et al. (2007) control for the house’s assessed value, as well as year fixed effects and a dummy 
for fee-simple contracts. In time-to-sale regressions they also control for the difference between the list and 
sale price.  Evans and Kolbe (2005) only include quarter fixed effects and a dummy for whether the same 
agent represented the buyer in the first transaction and the seller in the second.   6   
results:  Strategic  pricing,  where  agents  induce  their  clients  to  set  high  list  prices  in 
anticipation of an already-identified internal buyer with a high willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
making an offer; and leaning on the seller, where seller agents pressure their clients to 
reduce prices or accept lower bids in order to capture both sides of commission or to 
curry favor with colleagues, to exploit transactional efficiencies of dual agency, and to 
close deals faster.  
Although we are unable to fully tease apart these alternative mechanisms, we 
cautiously  conclude  that  agents  do  engage  in  some  behaviors  which  increase  the 
likelihood of dual agency and which affect both the price and the speed of transactions. 
However, similar to what Mehran and Stulz (2007) find for financial markets, our results 
suggest  that  the  overall  consequences  of  the  conflicts  of  interest  and  other  incentive 
misalignment issues that arise in dual-agency deals in residential real estate are small. In 
short, our results suggest that by altering agents' incentives and behavior, allowing dual 
agency  may  reduce  time-to-sale,  and  has  a  negligible  net  effect  on  sale price.  These 
findings provide  little  support  for  the prohibition  of  dual  agency  in  any  form  (either 
within-agency or dual-agent deals). We discuss in section 5.5 how this might contrast 
with dual agency situations in other industries.  The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows.   
In  Section  2,  we  discuss  agent  incentives  in  cross-agency  and  dual-agency 
transactions.  In  Section  3,  we  briefly  describe  and  assess  legislative  and  market 
approaches for regulating dual agency in the housing market.  In Section 4, we describe 
our data, and in Section 5, we present our empirical results.  We conclude in section 6.  
 
2.  Agent Incentives in Cross-Agency and Dual-Agency Transactions 
2.1:  Cross agency incentive issues 
Before exploring dual agency incentive issues, it is useful to first consider the 
incentives for agents in a standard, cross-agency transaction. There are several principal-
agent issues in the real estate market (see Yinger 1981, Salant 1991, Bryant and Epley 
1992, Wheaton 1990, Yavas et. Al. 2001, etc.). First, both agents are compensated as a   7   
function of the final sale price
3. This misaligns incentives: buyers’ agents (as well as 
sellers’ agents) benefit from a higher sale price, even though this represents a loss to their 
clients
4. However, this misalignment of incentives is counterbalanced by the desire to 
develop and maintain a good reputation, as a means to attract more clients, which creates 
a strong incentive for buyers’ agents to bargain aggressively for a low price (resulting in 
a low commission) on behalf of their clients. For a seller’s agent, bargaining aggressively 
on behalf of her clients results in higher prices and higher commissions.  
Second, the assumption that agents want to maximize their commission might 
oversimplify their incentives. Specifically, the seller’s agent must evaluate the additional 
commission earned from a higher price against the cost of waiting longer to conclude the 
deal. Levitt and Syverson (2005) show that real estate agents wait longer to sell, but 
obtain  a  higher  price,  when  they  sell  their  own  houses  compared  to  selling  clients’ 
houses
5.  Hendel,  Nevo,  and  Ortalo-Magne  (2007)  find  an  interesting  parallel  – 
homeowners who sell their homes themselves (instead of using a broker) wait longer but 
also obtain a sale price premium over houses sold via agents. These results are driven by 
the fact that agents capture only a small fraction of the additional proceeds from each 
sale, while incurring much of the additional cost of marketing the houses (Levitt and 
Syverson, 2005, Rutherford et al. 2005). Therefore, existing research suggests that selling 
agents benefit from concluding transactions faster, rather than holding out longer for a 
possibly higher price. Consequently, misaligned incentives can have an impact on both 
the sale price and time-to-sale in standard, cross agency deals.   
                                                 
3 An interesting question is why commission-based agency persists in real estate markets when there are 
known to be inefficiencies in this system.  See Jares, Larsen, and Zorn (2000) for a discussion, and an 
alternative that has the seller’s agent buy the property and have the put option of returning the house back 
to the seller. See also Bernheim and Meer (2008) for whether brokers perform enough functions to justify 
their commissions. 
4 Laws in  some states  have  attempted to ensure that agents representing buyers clearly owe  fiduciary 
responsibility to the buyer rather than be an agent for the seller or only loosely represent the buyer’s 
interest.  As expected, such laws have led to a drop in the sale price (see Curran and Schrag, 2000). 
5 A parallel situation is found in financial services markets where brokers are divided into agency and non-
agency brokers. Agency brokers are precluded from buying for themselves, and are only allowed to buy on 
their client’s behalf. Non-agency brokers usually offer lower transactions fees but also offer lower prices to 
sellers because of their incentive to buy low from sellers and sell high to their buyer clients (Harris, 2003).  
When  non-agency brokers are better informed than their  own clients, they trade on the value of their 
information. This finding is parallel to Levitt and Syverson (2005).   8   
   
2.2:  Why and how does dual agency arise? 
The process of buying and selling a house may be thought of as a two-stage, 
search and negotiation game between buyers, sellers, and their agents. When dual agency 
is permitted, the transaction can conclude either via dual-agency or as a standard, cross-
agency transaction.  We examine if there are any systematic correlations between this 
transaction  outcome  variable,  dual  agency,  and  two  other  key  transaction  outcome 
variables from this game, sale price and time-to-sale. Agents can engage in actions that 
affect the likelihood of a deal being done via dual agency and that ultimately affect the 
sale price and time-to-sale. In this subsection, we consider if and how an agent may wish 
to increase the likelihood of a dual-agency deal.   
Agents can undertake actions to increase the probability of dual agency if the 
benefits of dual agency outweigh the cost of it.  Dual agency offers several possible 
benefits to agents. First, it can speed up the search and/or negotiation process, allowing 
the agent to earn her commission(s) sooner. Second, it reduces the amount of time and 
effort  agents  must  spend  learning  about  and  showing  houses  to  clients.  Third,  buyer 
agents  tend  to  have  less  exclusive  and  shorter  contracts  with  their  buyer  clients. 
Therefore, the agent might not capture both commissions if the buyer does not buy the 
house where the same agent also represents the seller.   
These benefits serve as incentives for agents to try and influence clients to buy 
(sell)  from  (to)  internal  clients.  That  is,  agents  have  incentives  to  take  actions  that 
increase the incidence of dual-agency deals. These incentives are different for dual-agent 
versus within-agency deals. In within-agency deals, an agent may offer her listings to 
fellow-agents of the same agency, in the hopes that they will reciprocate in the future
6. In 
dual-agent deals, an agent can directly capture all the benefits herself rather than share 
with a colleague from her own agency.   
                                                 
6 Although there may be favor trading across agencies, it is easier to sustain such favor trading within an 
agency. Also, there do not appear to be any incentives provided by agencies to encourage more deals in-
house than cross-agency.   9   
There  are  also  some  disincentives  for  undertaking  actions  that  increase  the 
likelihood of a dual-agency deal. Should the agents hold out for the possibility of a dual- 
agency deal, they face a smaller pool of internal buyers than the market-wide pool of 
buyers. Similarly, the pool of internal listings is much smaller than the pool of external 
market listings. 
If  the  above  incentives  outweigh  the  disincentives,  agents  can  increase  the 
probability of becoming a dual agent (agency) and conducting a dual-agency transaction 
by influencing clients’ actions in either stage of the game: (1) Manipulating the search 
process  by  steering  the  seller  (buyer)  clients  to  internal  buyers  (sellers),  and  (2) 
Manipulating  the  negotiation  process  by  leaning  on  the  seller  (buyer)  to  accept  the 
internal  buyer’s  (seller’s)  offer.  These  manipulations  of  the  search  and  negotiation 
process can affect the other two outcome variables of interest, the sale price and the time-
to-sale. 
In (1), agents use their influence on their clients’ search process to steer buyers 
and sellers toward dual-agency deals. Agents can do this by showing their listings to 
internal buyer clients before showing them to other agents’/agencies’ clients. Similarly, 
they might show their buyer clients their own listings before showing them listings of 
other agents/agencies.  
In (2), an agent (or agency) is already a dual agent, representing both sides in a 
negotiation. The agent (agency) may have achieved dual status by steering clients toward 
each other (as in (1)), or the dual agency may have arisen spontaneously.  For example, a 
buyer may see a for-sale sign on a property and call the seller agent whose name is listed 
on  the  sign.  Similarly,  an  agency  may  become  a  dual  agency  if  a  buyer  who  is 
represented by an agent discovers a house where the seller agent works for the same 
agency as the buyer agent. Once the agent or agency has achieved dual agent/cy status in 
the negotiation process, they can help close the dual- agency deal by leaning on the seller 
or buyer to accept the other’s offer.   
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2.3: Conflict of interest and incentive misalignment in dual agency 
    Allowing for dual agency can create both conflicts of interest as well as incentive 
misalignment for agents. The incentive misalignment arises primarily in the client search 
stage, while the conflict of interest arises primarily in the client negotiation stage (but can 
also arise in the search stage; see section 5.3 for a discussion of this).  
In the search stage, the agent’s incentive to find a dual-agency deal results in 
misaligned  incentives  with  her  client;  the  agent  has  an  incentive  to  match  the  buyer 
(seller) with an internal seller (buyer), while the buyer (seller) only wants to find the best 
value (buyer with the highest WTP). In this case, the agent’s efforts to match the buyer 
(seller)  with  internal  sellers  (buyers)  are  not  necessarily  in  the buyer’s  (seller’s) best 
interests.  
In the negotiation stage of a dual-agency transaction, agents face a clear conflict 
of interest due to the zero-sum nature of price negotiations. Agents face the impossible 
task of trying to simultaneously obtain the lowest possible price for the buyer and the 
highest possible price for the seller in the same transaction. In this case, the agent may 
either lean on the seller to accept a lower price from an internal buyer than what she 
could expect to obtain from an external buyer, or the agent can lean on the buyer to 
accept  a  higher  price  from  an  internal  seller.  The  agent  may  further  manipulate  the 
negotiations by divulging confidential information to either client in an effort improve the 
other’s bargaining position. For example, the agent might share information about the 
buyer’s WTP with the seller, bolstering the seller’s willingness to hold out for a higher 
price. Such a tactic could enhance the agent’s ability to pressure the buyer to accept a 
higher price. Regardless, the agent is giving preferential treatment to one client at the 
expense of the other, with the intent of creating a dual-agency deal.   
Given that agents can give preferential treatment to either buyers or sellers in the 
negotiation stage, the question arises: On whom will agents lean – the buyer or the seller? 
The vast majority of seller’s agreements are exclusive. In contrast, the relationship with 
buyers is looser and less formal, often even without signed agreements (see Brown and 
Yingling, 2007). Therefore, we might expect the dual agent(cy) to exploit this asymmetry   11   
by leaning on the seller to accept a lower price from an internal buyer.  On the other 
hand, because commissions increase with sale price, the incentive to lean on a buyer to 
accept a higher price from an internal seller may be greater than the incentive to lean on a 
seller.    Therefore,  the  direction  and  magnitude  of  agent  leaning  (if  it  occurs)  is  an 
empirical question.  
 
2.4: Price and speed in dual-agency transactions 
In both the search and the negotiation stage, the agent’s efforts to increase the 
probability of a dual-agency deal can also affect the price and speed of the transaction. 
For  example,  if  agents  routinely  first  show  internal  listings  to  buyer  clients  before 
showing them other listings, then steering may be correlated with, but will not cause, 
faster sales. On the other hand, because of the smaller pool of internal buyers and sellers, 
steering  clients  to  internal  buyers  or  sellers  may  delay  the  time-to-sale.  Similarly,  if 
agents lean on clients in the negotiation phase, then this will clearly affect the transaction 
price, with the direction depending on which client the agent chooses to pressure. If the 
agent leans on the buyer to accept the internal seller’s offer, then this should have a 
positive effect on price (and vice versa). However, regardless of which client the agent 
pressures to close the deal, leaning on a client should unambiguously reduce the time-to-
sale,  as  the  agent  encourages  the  client  to  accept  an  offer  rather  than  continue 
negotiations (or continue searching). 
Beyond its effect on agent incentives and behavior, allowing dual agency may 
also affect transaction prices and speed by  allowing for better information flows and 
transaction efficiencies. Agents know more about the preferences (house characteristics) 
of their own buyer (seller) clients, while agents in the same agency are likely to share 
information about available listings and client preferences. Conversations with real estate 
agents  who  have  worked  at  multiple  agencies  indicate  that  agencies  hold  weekly 
meetings in which agents describe their available listings and search parameters of their 
buyer clients to see if any matches can be made internally.  This internal information 
sharing can result in better and quicker matches between internal buyers and sellers. This   12   
should  have  a  positive  effect  on  sale  prices,  since  available  houses  are  being  better 
matched  with  buyers,  who  are  likely  to  agree  to  these  better  preference  matches.  
Additionally, this behavior will have a negative effect on time-to-sale, since the added 
information leads to quicker matches. Moreover, once a match is made, dual agency may 
offer efficiencies in processing and transferring documents, enabling a faster transaction.   
   
 
3. Legislative and Market Responses to Dual Agency 
There have been a wide range of public and private responses to the challenges 
posed by dual agency. As we discuss below, all of them have focused on the inherent 
conflict of interest that the dual agent/agency faces in the negotiation stage, and none 
have focused on the incentive misalignment.  
 
3.1: Legislative responses to dual agency conflict of interest 
Olazabal  (2003)  provides  a  thorough  summary  of  various  types  of  agency 
relationships in real estate.  As she describes, for most of the twentieth century, sellers 
listed  their  property  in  multiple  listing  services  with  a  “listing  broker.”    A  “selling 
broker” would show the property to the buyer, but the selling broker did not represent the 
buyer. Both the listing and selling broker received their commission from the seller, and 
neither owed any fiduciary responsibility to the buyer.  This left the seller open to legal 
liability due to agent misbehavior.  While such situations, by definition, did not have dual 
agency conflicts, they  were certainly subject to misaligned incentives as discussed in 
section 2.1.  
Over  time,  legislation  and  market  forces  have  resulted  in  more  buyer 
representation, as well as a reduction in seller liability for actions of agents. Despite these 
changes, dual agency has persisted. However, responding to criticisms that the resulting 
system of dual agency was not transparent and created conflicts of interest, beginning in 
the early 1990s, many states passed laws that placed restrictions on dual agency. As a 
result of these changes in state laws, most states’ dual agency policies currently fall into   13   
one  of  three  categories:  dual  agency  with  disclosure,  designated  dual  agency,  and 
transactional brokerages.  
New York is one of several states that allows for dual agency with disclosure. 
These states have chosen to allow the practice of dual agency to continue, even in the 
case  where  the  same agent  represents both  the buyer  and  the  seller  in  a  transaction. 
However, all of these states now require agents to disclose their dual-agency status to 
both  the  buyer  and  the  seller.  It  is  not  evident  that  disclosure  alone  will  reduce  the 
conflict of interest, given the manipulations of the search and negotiation processes might 
be subtle enough to go undetected by the harmed party (buyer, seller or both).   
A smaller number of states (e.g., Colorado, Maryland) allow for designated dual 
agency. This allows the same agency to serve both parties in the transaction, but prohibits 
the same agent from doing so.  In designated agency, a brokerage firm may designate one 
agent to represent the seller and a different agent to represent the buyer. As discussed in 
section 2.2 above, it is not evident that conflicts of interest are any less likely on within-
agency deals, when favors are traded by agents of a single agency.   
Finally, other states (e.g., Florida) do not allow the buyer and seller agent to be 
from  the  same  agency,  but  allow  a  new  type  of  entity,  a  transaction  brokerage,  to 
represent both the buyer and the seller in a transaction. A transaction brokerage provides 
many of the same services as a real estate agency, but does not legally represent either 
party  in  the  transaction.  The  lack  of  legal  representation  for  either  party  solves  the 
conflict of interest because of the disinterestedness of the agent, but this does not prevent 
the  agent  from  looking  out  for  her  own  self-interest.  Interestingly,  the  National 
Association for Realtors (NAR) refused to endorse such legislation, arguing that agents 
owe fiduciary responsibility to clients.   
States also vary in their disclosure requirements for dual agents. For example, 
some states, including New York, require that agents disclose their dual status in writing, 
while other states only require a verbal disclosure. Similarly, states differ in their policies 
regarding when the dual agent/agency is obligated to inform the buyer of dual-agency 
status (Olazabal, 2003).  The later the agent is obligated to reveal to the client that she   14   
represents both sides of the transaction, the more likely it is that either the seller or the 
buyer will reveal information (e.g. minimum or maximum acceptable price, respectively) 
that the agent might use to favor the other party (and herself). In other words, the more 
lax the disclosure requirements, the more likely it is that agents can indulge in conflicted 
interest behavior (and other principal-agent behaviors). In New York, agents are required 
to disclose their dual-agency status when substantive contact with a client is made.    
 
3.2:  Market responses to dual agency conflict of interest 
Real estate firms have responded variously to any possible conflict of interest that 
remains even after the law has attempted to clarify it.  First, some real estate firms act as 
a “buyer’s broker,” with exclusive fiduciary duty to the buyer, receiving payment from 
the buyer (rather than the seller). While designed to protect buyers, this also helps to 
protect the seller from any conflict of interest for the seller’s own broker. Some agencies 
have  even  gone  further,  specializing  in  representing  only  buyers
7.    But  given  the 
functioning of the real estate market (e.g. a buyer sees a property that she likes and calls 
the agent whose contact information is on the for-sale sign), exclusive buyer’s agents 
cannot be a complete solution.   
A second response from agents/agencies has been the adoption of a self-imposed 
policy of providing referrals should a dual-agency transaction arise.  These referrals are 
sometimes to other agents in the same firm (i.e., the equivalent of a designated broker), 
and sometimes to agents at other firms (see www.activerain.com/blogspot for examples).  
A third response of some agents has been to go further than the law requires and 
draft  their  own  contract  for  dual-agency  situations  (e.g.,  see  discussion  on 
www.bloodhound.com), arguing that it is unclear if consumers understand the complex 
implications of the dual agency laws (Olazabal, 2003). These contracts try to make clear 
                                                 
7 A discussion on www.bloodhound.com is particularly succinct in its description of issues. One agent 
posted his objection to dual  agency by likening it to the same attorney representing  both parties in a 
divorce.  To which another agent responded “Who do you think usually comes out ahead in a divorce, the 
divorcing couple or the attorneys? If the divorce is amicable, or the couple doesn’t really have any assets or 
children, do they really need the additional expense (attorney)? Isn’t divorce, by definition, costly enough?” 
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the  conflict  of  interest  in  dual-agency  contracts  and  urge  both  buyers  and  sellers  to 
understand their rights.  For example, consider these two clauses (from an agent Greg 
Swann of Arizona): “The duties of the Licensee(s) in this transaction do not relieve the 
Seller or the Buyer from the responsibility to protect their own interests” and “If you are 
not  completely  comfortable  with  this  disclosure  of  Dual  Representation,  you  are 
encouraged to obtain separate representation in this transaction.”   
Despite these responses by agents/agencies, it is unclear if agencies can protect 
buyers  and  sellers  from  the  deficiencies  of  these  dual  agency  laws  and  the  resulting 
incentive conflicts. While these contracts provide additional disclosure and discussion of 
dual agency and the resultant conflict of interest, they do not offer any legal protections 
to either buyer or seller. This is because the agent behaviors that might harm buyers and 
sellers (e.g., disclosure of private information to the other party) are difficult to observe. 
Moreover, as noted above, none of these responses attempts to address the misalignment 
of incentives in the search (and possibly negotiation) stage created by permitting dual 
agency. Therefore, in the following sections we attempt to empirically assess the impact 
of  permitting  dual-agency  transactions,  and  to  examine  whether  the  emphasis,  in  the 
public and private responses, on reducing conflict of interest alone is appropriate. To do 
so, we compare the price and speed of dual-agency and cross-agency transactions.  
 
4. Data 
Our dataset comprises 10,891 randomly-selected, single-family, residential home 
sales in Long Island, New York, spanning the years 2004-2007. The data come from the 
Long Island Board of Realtors, which owns the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) of Long 
Island, Inc. The MLS is a clearinghouse where realtors list properties for sale. 
This dataset has several advantages. First, the data contain a wealth of information 
on  house  location  and  house  characteristics.  Among  many  other  specifics,  the  data 
indicate the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and other rooms in the house, the number 
of  fireplaces,  the  capacity  of  the  garage(s),  the  presence  and  type  of  driveway,  the 
presence of a basement and whether it is finished, and much more. Transactions also list   16   
the names of the seller and buyer agent, the name of the agency for which each works, 
the number of days the house was on the market, the price at which the seller listed the 
house for sale, and the final sale price
8. MLS requires all sellers’ agents to enter the 
property  within  24-48  hours  of  reaching  an  agreement  to  list  the  house.  Also,  if  a 
property is already under agreement for sale, MLS rules prohibit listing it in MLS as 
available. This gives us confidence in the measure of time-to-sale in our data.   
It is important to note that the MLS data have some flaws, as noted by Levitt and 
Syverson, 2005):  
“The information in the database is entered by the real estate agents themselves. 
There is no independent check on the accuracy of the description of the home’s 
attributes. Also, there are few restrictions on what agents can type into a field in 
the database and no requirement that all fields be completed. As a consequence, 
there  are  substantial  amounts  of  missing  data  for  some  variables…,  some 
evidence of obvious errors, and a lack of uniformity in the way fields are coded.” 
To deal with these issues, we drop observations that appear to reflect erroneous 
data.  For example, we exclude observations where the list price or sale price is less than 
$50,000 and where the sale price is either less than one third of the list price or more than 
three  times  the  list  price.  Similarly,  we  exclude  houses  with  no  bathrooms  or  no 
bedrooms.  
There are two additional issues relating to the measure of time-to-sale.  First, it is 
possible that some houses are never listed on MLS because there is already a buyer for 
the  house.  It  seems  likely  that  such  cases  would  occur  more  often  via  dual  agency, 
because agents have greater knowledge about internal buyers.  If this is the case, then our 
estimates  of  the  relationship  between  dual  agency  and  time-to-sale  will  be  biased 
upwards.  Second,  as  discussed  by  Levitt  and  Syverson  (2005),  houses  sitting  on  the 
market for a long time are sometimes withdrawn and then re-listed on MLS, re-setting the 
                                                 
8 Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) have a unique dataset from England that includes all offers made on a 
house before the final sale and any changes in list price during this period.  This allows them to analyze 
seller and buyer behavior within a transaction (rather than across).  Our dataset only has the original list 
price and the final sales price, and the identity of the seller agent and the buyer agent. This suffices for the 
purposes of our study.   17   
days on market to zero.  This will not affect our estimates for role of dual agency unless 
there  is  a  systematic  correlation  between  dual  agency  and  re-listing,  which  seems 
unlikely. Nonetheless, if dual agency is more likely for re-listed houses, this would cause 
a negative bias in our measure of the relationship between list price and dual agency, 
because the second list price is likely to be lower than the first. In our results below, we 
find  a  positive  relationship  between  list  price  and  dual  agency.  Therefore,  we  are 
confident that re-listings are not driving our results. 
To  measure  dual  agency  we  create  three  indicator  variables:  AllDualAgency 
indicates that the same agency represents both the buyer and the seller in the transaction. 
DualAgent  indicates  that  the  same  agent  represents  both  the  buyer  and  the  seller. 
WithinAgency indicates that the buyer and seller are represented by different agents who 
work for the same agency.   
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all of our variables. We see that nearly 
half (47%) of all transactions occur via dual agency, with the majority of these cases 
comprising dual-agent deals (26% vs. 21%)
9. Table 2 provides sample means by agency 
type (dual-agency or cross-agency) for our three key variables: sale price, list price, and 
time-to-sale. There are no substantial differences between the dual-agency and the cross-
agency deals, although we do see that sale price and time-to-sale are slightly lower for 
dual-agency deals.  
 
---Insert tables 1 and 2 here--- 
                                                 
9 This proportion of dual agency cases may seem high. A possible explanation is that some of the dual 
agency deals are instances of subagency. In subagency, the agent listed as the buyer’s agent is actually a 
subagent of the seller, with fiduciary responsibilities to the seller only (note that cross-agency deals could 
also  have  instances  of  subagency).  Previous  papers  on  dual  agency  also  face  the  same  issue  of 
misclassification, because MLS data do not indicate whether the buyer is represented by a buyer’s agent or 
a subagent of the seller. Subagency is likely to increase the sale price and increase the time-to-sale relative 
to transactions where the buyer is represented by a buyer’s agent (Curran and Schrag, 2000). We find that 
dual agency has the opposite effect on time-to-sale, and we find that the effect of dual agency on price 
varies  with  the  speed  of  transaction.  These  findings  cannot  be  explained  by  the  misclassification  of 
subagency.     18   
Table  3  provides  information  about  the  Long  Island  real  estate  market.  The 
market is highly competitive. There are 1010 real estate agencies in our sample
10. They 
range in size from single-agent firms, to agencies with more than 200 agents. In almost 
4200 (more than 38%) of the transactions, the selling agency has fewer than five agents, 
while in more than 1900 transactions (almost 18%) the selling agency has more than fifty 
agents. Only a small number of agencies (27) have multiple branches; but these agencies 
tend to be very large, comprising slightly more than one third of all the transactions in 
our sample. 
 
---Insert Table 3 here--- 
 
  Before assessing how dual agency relates to the price and speed of transactions, 
we  first  examine  whether  the  incidence  of  dual  agency  varies  with  agency  size.  In 
particular, we assess whether there is a greater incidence of within-agency transactions in 
larger  firms,  where  agents  have  a  larger  network  of  colleagues  with  whom  to  share 
transactions. The results of our probit analysis, which we report in Table 4, confirm our 
intuition: selling agents in larger agencies are more likely to sell to buyers represented by 
agents in the same agency. The estimated marginal effects indicate that a doubling of the 
number  of  agents  in  an  agency  increases  the  probability  of  a  dual-agency  deal  by 
approximately 0.8 percentage points (this effect is statistically significant at 0.101).  
 
---Insert Table 4 here--- 
   
5.  Empirical Analysis 
 
Our goal in this section is to empirically assess how the incidence of dual agency 
relates to the price and speed of transactions, and to understand if these relationships 
                                                 
10 Our data are only a random sample of the completed transactions during this time period. We could not 
obtain all transactions because of limits on downloads from the MLS website. This limits our ability to 
accurately measure the distribution of firm size, and especially its variation over time, since some of the 
variation that we observe results from the sampling.     19   
reveal  underlying  agent  behaviors  driven  by  conflict  of  interest  and/or  misaligned 
incentives associated with dual agency.  In our analysis, we treat the incidence of dual 
agency as a proxy for unobservable agent behaviors that increase the likelihood of a dual-
agency deal and may affect transaction outcomes (rather than treating dual agency as an 
explanatory variable). We try to identify underlying agent behaviors that both increase 
the likelihood that a house is sold via dual agency and that influence the price and speed 
of  transactions  in  a  manner  consistent  with  our  results.  Using  our  results,  we  then 
examine whether prohibiting dual agency might reduce or eliminate these behaviors, and 
how this might affect welfare of buyers and sellers.  
 
5.1. Observable Variables Affecting Sale Price and Time-to-sale 
We consider many observable factors that are likely to affect final sale price and 
time-to-sale for residential houses. These factors can be broadly grouped as: property-
specific,  agency-specific,  agent-specific,  time-specific,  and  market-specific.  Consider 
first  property-specific  variables.  In  our  regressions,  we  include  various  hedonic 
descriptors of the property including number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, number 
of other rooms, fireplaces, capacity of the garage(s), etc. We also include dummies for 
various amenities, including an eat-in kitchen, pool, finished basement, etc. In addition, 
we include dummies for house style (e.g. Colonial, Cape Cod, etc.), type of fuel (e.g. gas, 
oil,  etc.),  age  of  the  house,  seller  agent’s  assessment  of  the  house’s  condition  (e.g. 
excellent, mint, good, etc.), and other characteristics (see Table 1 for a complete list of 
house characteristics for which we control)
11. In some cases, we also include the list price 
of the house to control for features of house quality like southern exposure of the house, 
new countertops, etc., that are not observable in the data
12. 
                                                 
11 The data also contain a variable measuring square footage; however, lot size, instead of actual square 
footage, was entered in some cases. Moreover, this variable is missing in many cases. Nonetheless, our 
results are generally robust to inclusion of this variable. 
12 Taylor (1999) suggests that a house with a low list price sitting on the market for a long time can be 
viewed as a lemon. Genesove and Mayer (1997) show that sellers with lower equity positions built in the 
house set higher list prices and receive higher sale prices.  Our inclusion of list price captures these effects 
too.   20   
Next, agencies might differ systematically in price setting and time-to-sale.  For 
example, ReMax agents keep 100% of the commission of the transaction and pay the 
agency fixed fees for office usage and other overheads. In most other agencies, agents 
give half of their commission to the agency to cover “desk costs” (Munneke and Yavas, 
2001). These compensation differences might alter price-setting behavior and time-to-
sale.  Agencies  also  might  differ  in  their  market power.    These  differences  in  market 
power and size might cause systematic differences in dual agency. For example, a larger 
agency might expect to be able to set a higher list price and obtain a higher sale price, and 
at the same time have a higher incidence of dual agency because of more agents working 
for the firm. In addition, because of differences in inventories of unsold houses, agencies 
might face varying pressure to sell houses. We control for such agency differences by 
including seller agency fixed effects in our models. 
Agents’ differences might also affect price and time-to-sale. For example, agents 
might differ in their reputation, ability to bargain, expertise, discount factors (e.g. as a 
function of the inventory of unsold houses and number of buyers they serve), etc. These 
differences might be systematically correlated with dual agency.  For example, a seller 
who hires a reputed agent might set a high list price with the expectation of getting a 
higher sale price. This reputed agent might have a longer list of buyer clients than other 
agents and therefore end up being a dual agent more often.  To control for the influence 
of  these  factors  on  sale price  and  time-to-sale,  we  include  seller  agent-specific  fixed 
effects in our models
13. 
Finally, time-varying and time-invariant market-specific variables are also likely 
to influence our key variables. Some of these market-specific variables include school 
district quality, tax rates, current interest rates, expected future interest rates, employment 
rate, inventory of unsold houses and new home construction, trends in the industry (e.g., 
internet penetration, which gives buyers information beyond that provided by agents), 
                                                 
13 Note that agency and agent fixed effects are not collinear because agents change agencies within the 
sample.   21   
and  concentration  of  real  estate  agents
14.  We  include  zip  code-year  fixed  effects  to 
account for these variations.  
 
5.2. Relating Dual Agency to Sale Price and Time-to-Sale 
  We begin our analysis by comparing outcomes between dual and cross agency 
deals, controlling for a wide range of exogenous variables. By doing so, we effectively 
“difference out” any spurious correlation between our outcome variables (sale price and 
time-to-sale) and dual agency that is due to selection on these variables. This allows us to 
better identify the net effect of underlying behaviors that both increase the likelihood that 
a house will be sold via dual agency and affect the price and speed of transactions.  To do 
so, we use dual agency as a proxy for the unobservable agent behaviors. The estimated 
coefficient on dual agency provides an estimate of the net effect of these behaviors. 
We first estimate the following equations for the sale price for house i listed in 
year t: 
 
(1a)          1 2 1 ln Pr it 1it 2it it it Sale ice X   X DualAgency α α β ε = + + +     
(1b)          1 2 3 1 ln Pr it 1it 2it it it it Sale ice X   X ListPrice DualAgency α α α β ε = + + + +     
 
In these equations, X1 contains house characteristics, and X2 contains fixed effects for zip 
code-years,  agencies,  and  agents,  as  described  in  Section  5.1.  We  estimate  these 
equations  (and  all  succeeding  equations  that  include  dual  agency  as  a  covariate)  two 
different ways: (a) including the DualAgent and WithinAgency variables, and (b) using 
the  AllDualAgency  variable,  which  combines  the  two  categories  of  dual  agency.  In 
equation  (1b),  we  also  include  the  list  price.    The  list  price  controls  for  house 
characteristics that are unavailable to us in the data but are observable to buyers and 
sellers and therefore affect list price and sale price. The list price might also capture 
                                                 
14 Hsieh and Moretti (2003) show that the low cost of entry in to the residential real estate agent market 
causes  the  number  of  agents  to  be  positively  related  to  the  cost  of  land  (and  hence  the  size  of  the 
commission in any transaction) in the market.  Our zip code-year fixed effects control for both market-
specific land price differences, and competitive structure differences.   22   
house characteristics that are observable to sellers but less perfectly observable to buyers 
(e.g. a quiet neighborhood, or year-round weather-readiness of the house). In addition, it 
might be systematically correlated with behavior(s) of selling agents. As we will discuss 
below,  the  difference  in  the  two  regressions  can  aid  us  in  assessing  the  underlying 
behavior(s) generating the results we find.  
The results for both equations are in Table 5. The estimates for equation (1a) 
(columns 1 and 2) indicate that, holding our control variables fixed, sale prices are not 
different in dual-agency deals. However, the estimates for equation (1b) (columns 3 and 
4) indicate that, after controlling for the list price, sale price is lower for dual-agency 
deals than for cross-agency deals. Moreover, the difference is greater for dual-agent deals 
than for within-agency deals
15.   
These results imply that the list price is higher on dual-agency deals.  To confirm 
this, we estimate the following model: 
 
(2)          1 2 1 ln Pr it 1it 2it i i List ice X   X DualAgency α α β ε = + + +  
 
We report the results in the final two columns in Table 5.  Taken together, the results in 
Table 5 indicate that while list prices are higher on dual-agency deals, sale prices are not. 
Below, we discuss agent behaviors that might generate these results. 
 
---Insert Table 5 here--- 
 
Next, we estimate the following equations for time-to-sale, which are symmetric 
to equations (1a) and (1b):  
 
(3a)          1 2 1 ln it 1it 2it it it TimeToSale X   X   DualAgency α α β ε = + + +  
(3b)          1 2 3 1 ln Pr it 1it 2it it it it TimeToSale X X List ice DualAgency α α α β ε = + + + +  
                                                 
15 This difference is statistically significant at .022.   23   
 
The results for these equations are in Table 6. These results indicate that dual-
agency deals close about seven percent (on average, about six days) faster than cross-
agency deals
16.  Moreover, we see that the difference is about the same for within-agency 
deals  and  dual-agent  deals.  In  contrast  to  the  sale price  results  (Table  3),  the  timing 
results  are  essentially  unchanged  by  the  inclusion  of  the  list  price  as  an  explanatory 
variable (columns 3 and 4). We now turn to examining possible mechanisms for these 
results.  
 
---Insert Table 6 here--- 
   
5.3. Explaining Three Results 
In this subsection, we assess what types of agent behaviors might explain the 
results we report in Tables 5 and 6. Specifically, we want to identify agent behaviors that 
can explain the three key results: (1) there is no difference in sale price between dual and 
cross agency deals; (2) list price is higher on dual-agency deals than on cross-agency 
deals; and (3) houses sell faster in dual-agency deals than in cross-agency deals (even 
when we control for list price). We propose agent behaviors that can individually or 
jointly generate these results.  We then discuss welfare implications from these behaviors. 
 
5.3.1. First-resort Selling 
The first behavior we propose is first-resort selling.  As part of this behavior, 
agents routinely show houses to internal clients before external clients. By doing so, the 
agent is altering the search process for both buyers and sellers; there is no assumption 
that  the  agent  leans  on  the  seller  or  the  buyer  in  the  negotiation  process,  should  a 
potential match be found.  This behavior reflects the incentive misalignment in the search 
                                                 
16 Note that the  marginal effects that  we report are approximations. The  marginal effect in a semilog 
specification,  like  ours,  equals  exp(β)-1  (Thornton  and  Innes,  1989).  Nonetheless,  in  our  results,  the 
estimated coefficients and the marginal effects on the dual agency variables never differ by more than 
0.006. Therefore, we simply report the estimated coefficients.   24   
stage of the home purchase, as agents are responding to the private incentives associated 
with dual-agency transactions.   
First-resort  selling  is  consistent  with  all  three  results  we  find  above.  It  is 
consistent with dual-agency deals closing faster (result 3) simply because, if a house sells 
fast, it likely was sold to one of the first buyers to view it, and this early viewer was 
likely an internal client if first-resort selling is taking place. Next, if we assume that a 
high list price increases the probability of the deal concluding via dual agency, then first-
resort selling can also explain why list prices are higher in dual-agency deals (result 2).  
To see why this assumption might hold, consider a seller of a house that has 
features that are more experience-good in nature, and cannot be captured by the house 
descriptors in our data. For example, this house might be in a quiet neighborhood, have 
uniform  heating  in  the  winter,  or  trees  protecting  the  house  from  overheating  in  the 
summer, etc.  In setting the list price for such a house, the seller might not be confident of 
setting a price high enough to capture all of these house qualities, given the difficulty in 
credibly explaining them to a buyer.  However, the seller might still set a price higher 
than the expected price based on pure observables.  Therefore, while the list price might 
seem high relative to observables, the house is still a good deal after factoring in the good 
unobservables.  If agents routinely show houses to internal clients before showing them 
to external clients, some of these internal clients will recognize a good deal and close the 
deal fast. And these same buyers might trust their own (dual) agent explaining these 
house features more than they would trust an independent seller’s agent.  Therefore, the 
dual agent can use her central position in the deal to aid the search/match process.  This 
mechanism  then  can  explain  the  higher  list  prices  on  dual-agency  deals,  and  is  also 
consistent with faster sales in dual agency. However, this mechanism would seemingly 
predict higher sale prices in dual agency
17.   
                                                 
17 Alternatively, in the case of a house with negative unobservables, the seller might choose to partially 
discount the list price, but not low enough to fully reflect the negative unobservables. In this case, these 
houses would be underpriced relative to observables, but overpriced relative to the unobservables. If agents 
routinely  show  houses  to  internal  clients  first,  these  clients  would  be  less  likely  to  buy  these  houses. 
Therefore, these houses would take longer to sell, again yielding faster dual agency sales, and higher list 
prices in dual agency.  However, here again, this would predict higher sale prices in dual agency.   25   
First-resort selling can also generate similar sale prices for dual and cross agency 
deals (1). To see this, consider that first-resort selling has opposing effects on sale price: 
Although the houses with positive unobservables are likely to be snatched up by internal 
buyers  at  high  sale  prices  (relative  to  observables),  the  misalignment  of  incentives 
between the agent and client, resulting from the agent pursuing a dual-agency deal, is 
likely to have a negative effect on price. Specifically, the agent’s attempts to show houses 
to internal clients first may result in inferior matches, as compared to the agent looking 
for the most interested buyers, regardless of their representation. Inferior matching will 
put downward pressure on sale prices, which can offset the positive effect of internal 
buyers buying the houses with good unobservables, resulting in a null overall correlation 
between dual agency and sale price.  
Agents might also influence buyers’ search by  trying to steer buyer clients to 
specific internal listings that the agents believe are good deals, i.e. where the list price is 
low, or where the agent believes the seller would be willing to accept a low sale price, 
relative to the observable and unobservable characteristics of the house.  The agent would 
have an incentive to do so in order to avoid losing the buyer client to another agent or 
agency.   
Consistent with our results, such behavior would yield faster sales in dual agency, 
as internal buyers would snap up the good deals. Moreover, this behavior should also 
yield lower sale prices in dual agency, after controlling for unobservables, which is also 
consistent with our results (when we include the list price to control for unobservable 
quality). In fact, this behavior is a type of targeted first-resort selling, where agents don’t 
necessarily show all internal sellers’ houses to internal buyer clients first, just the ones 
that are good deals
18. 
If  first-resort  selling  is  occurring,  its  empirical  implications  should  be  most 
pronounced on very fast deals.  That is, because agents show houses to internal buyers 
first, the incidence of dual agency should be disproportionately high on very fast deals, 
                                                 
18 We also consider a different type of cherry picking, in which agents try to steer internal buyers to houses 
with  higher  expected  sale  prices.    However,  we  find  no  evidence  that  the  probability  of  dual  agency 
increases with expected sale price.     26   
where the house never gets shown to the external market.  To assess this possibility, we 
examine whether the incidence of dual-agency deals is greater for very fast deals. The 
first three columns of Table 7 provide evidence that this is the case. Using different 
thresholds of time-to-sale, we see that unusually fast deals are more likely to be done via 
dual agency (consistent with correlation (3)). This is consistent with first-resort selling. 
 
---Insert Table 7 here--- 
 
To further examine this mechanism, we rerun the list price regression (equation 
(2)), including only those houses that sell in 21 days or fewer. We report the results of 
this analysis in the first two columns of Table 8.  
 
---Insert Table 8 here--- 
 
The relationship with dual agency remains positive and statistically significant. 
More importantly, the magnitude is much larger than it is in Table 5, where we include 
the entire sample. Among deals closing within 21 days, sellers set list prices about ten 
percent higher for dual-agency deals than for cross-agency deals. This result is consistent 
with agents first showing all houses to internal buyers, who quickly buy those houses that 
have good unobservables that are not fully reflected in the list price, driving result (2).  
Next, we re-estimate equation (1a), again including only those deals that close 
within 21 days.  The results, which we report in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8, reveal that 
dual-agency deals yield sale prices about five percent higher than cross agency deals. 
This is consistent with inferior matches resulting from agents manipulating the search 
processpartially offsetting the effects from internal clients snapping up good deal houses. 
The effects of inferior matching are likely to be present well beyond these very fast sales, 
which could then generate result (1) (i.e., no overall difference in sale price between dual 
and cross agency deals).   27   
Taken together, the results in Tables 5-8 are notably consistent with empirical 
predictions  of  first-resort  selling  behavior.  However,  there  are  other  possible  agent 
behaviors that could also help explain these results. We discuss these below.  
 
5.3.2. Strategic Pricing  
Consider now a situation where a seller’s agent advises her client to set a high list 
price for a house because she believes that there is a prospective internal buyer (either her 
own or one of her colleagues’) with a high WTP for the house (or a house of the same 
type). For example, an agent representing a client with a three-bedroom, two-bath house 
with cathedral ceilings, an eat-in kitchen, and a large back yard, might set a list price at 
$475,000 rather than $450,000, because she is aware that a colleague (or she, herself) has 
a client that is interested in finding a house with these particular features, who is willing 
to pay as much as $475,000.  In this case, the agent influences the buyer’s search process 
(by guiding the buyer to this house).  Within-agency match-making of high-WTP buyer 
clients  and  internal  listings  is  enabled  by  weekly  meetings  in  agencies  where  agents 
describe their available listings and search parameters of their buyers.   
We label this behavior as strategic pricing. Here, the conflict of interest arises in 
the search phase, as the agent clearly favors the interests of the seller in attempting to 
match him with the buyer whose information they are exploiting. Although this behavior 
occurs before  a match is made, it nonetheless reflects the conflict of interest in dual 
agency. Effectively, the agent anticipates the negotiation phase between internal seller 
and  buyer,  using  private  information  about  the  internal  buyer  to  inform  the  seller’s 
pricing strategy.   
Like first-resort selling, strategic pricing is quite consistent with our results for 
very  fast  deals.  Because  strategic  pricing  implies  that  the  selling  agent  has  already 
identified a likely buyer when the house first goes on the market, we should expect to see 
a disproportionate number of very fast deals done via dual agency, as we see in Table 7
19. 
                                                 
19 Recall that research has suggested that realtors are willing trade off a lower price for a faster deal.  
Strategic pricing suggests that dual agents do not have to make this tradeoff because of their unique 
position in the deal.   28   
Further, the pricing effects of strategic pricing should manifest almost exclusively on fast 
deals, and this is consistent with the results in Table 8. Strategic pricing would predict 
higher list prices, particularly on fast deals, and this is what we find. Further, the results 
show  that  even  after  bargaining,  in  deals  closing  in  three  weeks  or  less,  sellers  still 
capture five percent more on dual-agency deals than on cross-agency deals. This suggests 
that strategic pricing helps sellers’ agents capture bigger commissions.    
While strategic pricing may be occurring, we make two notes of caution. First, 
these deals are a small fraction of the total deals in the data.  Of the 10,891 transactions in 
the data, 1165 (11%) deals conclude in under 21 days, and of these, 627 (54% of these 
fast deals, or 5.8% of all deals) are dual-agency deals.  Therefore, strategic pricing, if it is 
occurring,  appears  to  affect  sale  prices  quite  rarely.  Second,  strategic  pricing  cannot 
explain result (1), i.e. it fails to explain why we find no difference between the sale prices 
for dual-agency and cross-agency deals in the full sample. Therefore, strategic pricing 
alone cannot explain our three main findings. 
 
5.3.3. Leaning on the Seller 
In this subsection, we consider an additional agent behavior that can explain why 
sale prices are not higher on dual-agency deals, despite the fact that they have higher list 
prices. This behavior - leaning on seller to accept a lower sale price - in conjunction with 
strategic pricing, can offer an alternative explanation to first-resort selling for our three 
main findings. While strategic pricing yields higher sale prices on very fast deals, these 
gains may be offset by price-cutting on other deals, as agents lean on sellers to reduce 
prices, in order to capture both sides of the commission or to curry favor with colleagues, 
and to close deals faster. As noted above, buyer contracts are generally looser than seller 
contracts, so leaning on the seller may be seen as a less risky means of actively pursuing 
a dual-agency deal. Because the agent cannot fully represent both sides’ interests, these 
incentives lead her to side more with the buyer in the negotiation stage, at the expense of 
the seller. This explanation is consistent with the results for equation (1b), reported in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, which show that conditional on the list price, sale prices are   29   
lower on dual-agency deals. It is also consistent with our finding that homes sell faster in 
dual agency, as agents lean on the seller to close dual-agency deals more quickly.  
 
5.4. Economic Harm from Dual Agency 
Our results provide little evidence that permitting dual agency has a substantial 
negative impact on the welfare of either buyers or sellers in the residential real estate 
market. Although our results are consistent with agents engaging in behaviors which are 
driven by the conflict of interest and incentive misalignment that arises in dual agency, in 
total these actions do not appear to substantially  harm buyers or sellers. We find no 
overall difference in the sale price of dual-agency transactions compared to cross-agency 
transactions. Moreover, we find that dual-agency transactions close more quickly than 
cross agency transactions. These results are consistent with agents engaging in first-resort 
selling, which can harm both buyers and sellers by less efficiently matching buyers and 
sellers. However, it does not appear that either buyers or sellers are being substantially 
negatively affected.    
Although our main results provide little evidence of substantial harm to either 
buyers or sellers, these benign overall effects might mask more pernicious effects.  When 
we analyze very fast deals, we find that homes sold via dual agency sell for about five 
percent more than comparable houses sold via standard, cross-agency transactions. In 
other words, on very fast deals, it appears that buyers pay a substantial premium in dual 
agency. Although these results, like the full-sample results, may be consistent with first-
resort selling, these results for very fast deals are also consistent with agents engaging in 
strategic pricing on some deals, while leaning on the sellers to reduce prices for internal 
buyers in other deals. Unfortunately, we cannot econometrically isolate which of these 
behaviors is taking place. Nevertheless, it appears that these behaviors are occurring in 
such a way that the net harm to buyers and sellers, across all deals, is small. Further, any 
negative effects on the transaction price may be at least partially offset by the greater 
speed of dual-agency transactions which can favor both buyers and sellers.   30   
Dual agency’s negative relationship with time-to-sale could reflect a welfare gain 
or loss, depending on the underlying agent behavior driving this result. For example, this 
may reflect a loss if agents are engaging in first-resort selling, or if they are learning on 
sellers to accept reduced prices from internal buyers, yielding worse matches than would 
result if dual agency were prohibited. Both of these behaviors, steering buyers to internal 
clients and/or leaning on sellers to accept a lower offer from an internal buyer, could lead 
to these clients settling for an inferior deal than one they would have found if dual agency 
were prohibited. Further, buyers could face a net loss if strategic pricing is taking place – 
they get the house faster, but at a substantially higher price. However, faster sales can 
represent  a  welfare  gain  if  the  benefits  from  buying/selling  a  house  more  quickly 
outweigh these potential losses. 
Beyond  these  agent behaviors, buyers  and  sellers benefit  if  faster  transactions 
come from improved transactional or information efficiencies of dual agency. There is no 
way for us to fully determine from the data if the faster transactions reflect welfare-
improving  transaction/information  efficiencies  or  potentially  welfare-reducing 
steering/pressuring. However, given dual agency’s mild relationship with prices, it seems 
unlikely  that  a  single  welfare-reducing  (to  buyers  or  sellers)  behavior  is  driving  the 
negative correlation with time-to-sale. Hence, we cautiously conclude that faster time-to-
sale for dual-agency transactions represent no net welfare loss in our data.  
 
5.5. Policy Implications 
Our results are consistent with three different agent behaviors: first-resort selling, 
as well as strategic pricing and leaning on the seller. Importantly, these behaviors reflect 
different  underlying  incentive  issues.  First-resort  selling  results  from  agent-client 
incentive misalignment (where the agent is favoring her own interest over the client’s), 
whereas strategic pricing and leaning on the seller arises from the conflict-of-interest 
inherent in dual agency (where the agent is favoring the interests of one client over those 
of another client).     31   
As mentioned previously, much of the legal and market debate on dual agency has 
focused on the conflict of interest in dual agency.  None of the regulatory responses has 
tried to address the incentive misalignment that underlies first-resort selling, a behavior 
that is consistent with our results, and which increases the incidence of dual agency. If 
regulatory or contractual interventions could address the incentive misalignment in the 
search stage, this might be an effective way to substantially reduce the incidence of dual 
agency. Consequently, our results, indicating first-resort selling as a potential driver of 
dual agency, suggest the need to broaden the discussion of dual agency to focus on the 
agent’s enhanced ability to further her own interests in these transactions.  In that sense, 
the policy  issues  surrounding  dual  agency  are  not  so  dissimilar  to  those  in  standard, 
cross-agency deals (see section 2.1 for a discussion of single-agency issues).  Similarly, 
discussions  of  real  estate  agent  behavior,  usually  viewed  in  a  standard,  cross-agency 
context, (e.g. FTC’s  October 2006 ruling  against MLS services  as limiting consumer 
choice) must recognize that dual agency also suffers from similar issues.   
Although dual agency misaligns agent incentives and creates conflicts of interest 
for agents, consistent with arguments made by Agrawal and Chen (2007), several factors 
may explain why these conflicts of interest cause little economic harm in the Long Island 
real estate market. This can be for two broad reasons: the efficacy of laws in the New 
York  state,  or  the  efficacy  of  the  residential  real  estate  market-place  in  solving  the 
conflict-of-interest problem.  
Among the possible industry features that might cause mild welfare effects are 
that there might be some market place responses in Long Island, along the lines discussed 
in section 3.2. In addition, several industry features might have helped as well.  These 
include due diligence by buyers and sellers becoming easier due to the internet, especially 
in the time period we are studying (2004-2007). In addition, barriers to entry in the real 
estate industry are low, with very few educational requirements for becoming a realtor, 
and therefore the industry is likely to be quite competitive (as seen in table 1, our market 
has a large number of agents and firms).    32   
So what is gained from prohibiting dual agency? Prohibiting dual agency would 
reduce or eliminate certain agent behaviors. Specifically, first-resort selling would no 
longer be possible and the ability to strategically price would be greatly reduced, since 
agents are less likely to have good inside information on buyers from other agencies. 
Further, agents would have no incentive to lean on sellers since the prospect of capturing 
both  sides  of  the  commission  (in  particular,  guaranteeing  they  get  the  buyer’s 
commission) would no longer exist. Prohibiting dual agency would also eliminate any 
transaction  and  informational  efficiencies  and  also  shrink  the  number  of  potential 
matches for buyers and sellers. However, as noted above, in our data these behaviors and 
efficiencies appear to have little effect on overall welfare. Consequently, we conclude 
that prohibiting dual agency in real estate likely represents no welfare gain, and could 
actually result in a welfare loss. 
Comparing the results for the Long Island housing market to other industries, the 
features of this industry that keep welfare effects small might not be present in other 
markets.  For example, consider the market for merger and acquisition advisory services, 
where dual agency is prohibited.  In this industry, the market for targets is thin (especially 
in hostile take-over situations).  Therefore, in the absence of “comps” or comparable 
targets, it might be harder for both parties to independently assess a fair transaction price.  
Also the investment banking industry is significantly more concentrated than the real 
estate agency markets; there are higher barriers to entry for new firms. This might make 
buyers and sellers (and legislators) more skittish about trusting a dual agent.  The Chinese 
Wall provisions in financial institutions are driven by similar rationales.  However, if the 
industry were to become more competitive, then dual agency would likely pose less of a 
problem.  Similarly,  if  it  were  easier  to  accurately  assess  the  value  of  a  target  to  an 
acquirer,  then  a  dual  agent  could  not  influence  sale  (and  asking  or  list  price),  and 
therefore negative welfare effects of dual agency would be unlikely. 
In legal transactions, law firms do not represent both sides of a lawsuit, likely 
because of the obvious need for protecting the privacy of communication between lawyer 
and  client.    Also  lawyers  are  more  likely  to  be  acutely  aware  of  possible  legal   33   
repercussions should either party to the lawsuit detect lack of good representation.  Most 
critically, parties to a lawsuit might have only a single chance of achieving their goal. For 
example, a divorcing party might find it very expensive or impossible to appeal a divorce 
settlement should the parties (or only one of them) fear a dual agent compromised their 
interests. Similarly, double jeopardy might apply to criminal cases, making it impossible 
to go judge-shopping till a favorable outcome is reached. This is unlike house buying or 
merger advisory services where parties may walk away from a prospective deal if they 
fear a dual agent is not serving their interest.  
Summarizing, competition can help mitigate harmful effects of dual agency in 
several markets, yet some markets (like legal transactions) might have unique features 
that make it impossible to allow dual agency.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We find that houses sold via dual agency sell at about the same sale price as 
similar houses that are sold in cross-agency transactions, but houses sold via dual agency 
have higher list prices and sell about seven percent faster. To understand these results, we 
consider  a  variety  of  agent behaviors  that  might both increase  the  likelihood  of dual 
agency and also affect the price and speed of transactions. These actions highlight the 
conflict of interest and/or misaligned incentives agents face in dual-agency deals.   We 
argue that first-resort selling and/or strategic pricing in conjunction with seller leaning are 
consistent with our empirical results.  Each of these behaviors has welfare ramifications; 
however, the net effect appears to be small.   
Overall, our results suggest that there are relatively benign welfare implications 
for both price and time-to-sale. This is in line with Mehran and Stulz’s assessment of the 
finance literature on conflicts of interest.  Therefore, prohibiting dual agency is likely an 
overreaction,  especially  as  prohibition  reduces  choices  for  both  buyers  and  sellers.  
Additionally,  it  is  not  clear  that  legal  requirements  for  practices  like  Chinese  Wall 
provisions for dual-agency transactions are required, given the benign effects we find in 
our data. Finally, the similarity of our results for dual-agent and within-agency deals are   34   
also  important  from  a  policy  perspective,  because  in  some  states,  like  Colorado  and 
Maryland  only  within-agency  deals  are  permitted.  Our  findings  suggest  that  this 
distinction between types of dual agency might not be effective for policy.  
Certain  features  of  the  real  estate  market  might  explain  the  mildness  of  our 
welfare results, and these features might not be present in other industries or the same 
industry in other locations. A useful avenue for further research is to examine whether 
our results from the Long Island, NY market generalize to other markets and industries 
where dual agency is permitted.     35   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean (Std Deviation) 
Sale price ($)  568,805 (361,462) 
List price ($)  596,960 (400,070) 
Time-to-sale (days)  83.11 (69.67) 
All dual agency (% of all transactions)  0.47 (0.50) 
Dual agent (% of all transactions)  0.26 (0.44) 
Within-agency (% of all transactions)  0.21 (0.41) 
House characteristics (X1)
*   
Number of rooms  7.37 (1.62) 
Number of bedrooms  3.54 (0.89) 
Number of bathrooms  2.05 (0.81) 
Family room  0.52 (0.50) 
Dining room  0.90 (0.31) 
Eat-in kitchen  0.87 (0.34) 
Number of fireplaces  0.42 (0.61) 
Dryer  0.76 (0.43) 
Basement  0.87 (0.33) 
Finished basement  0.67 (0.47) 
Garages  1.08 (0.70) 
Driveway  0.97 (0.17) 
Pool  0.09 (0.28) 
Year built  1945 (19) 
New construction (1 = yes)  0.03 (0.16) 
Other controls (X2)   
Zip code-years  429 
Agencies  1,010 
Agents  4,375 
N  10,891 
* In addition to these variables, we also include dummy variables for different categories 
of house style, type of construction (14 categories), type of fuel used (4 categories), type 
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Table 2: Comparing Means for Dual-Agency and Cross-Agency Deals 
 
Variable  Dual Agency  Cross Agency 
Sale price ($)  565,185   572,030 
List price ($)  596,669   597,219 
Time-to-sale (days)  81.5   84.5 





Table 3: Agency Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean (Median)  Min  Max 
Agency size (agents)  34.73 (9)  1  209 
Branches  4.64 (1)   1  31 





Table 4: The Relationship Between Within-Agency Deals and Agency Size  
 
Dependent variable:  Within-Agency Transaction Indicator Variable 
Estimation method: Probit 
 
Variable  Marginal Effect (std error) 
Ln(Agency size)  0.011 (0.008)  
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Table 5: The Relationship Between Sale and List Price and Dual Agency 
 
Dependent variable:  Ln(Sale Price) for columns 1-4, Ln(List Price) for columns 5&6 
Estimation method: OLS 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 





































Ln(List price)      0.945** 
( 0.005) 
0.945** 
( 0.005)     
Within R-square  0.73  0.73  0.98  0.98  0.73  0.73 
N  10,891  10,891  10,891  10,891  10,891  10,891 
 
+ Significant at 0.10; * Significant at 0.05; ** Significant at 0.01.  
Standard errors, clustered by agent, are in parentheses. 
All regressions include all house characteristics (X1) and seller agent, seller agency, and 
zip code-year fixed effects (X2), as described in section 5.1.    41   
Table 6:  The Relationship Between Time-to-Sale and Dual Agency 
 
Dependent variable:  Ln(Time-to-sale) 
Estimation method: OLS 
 
  1  2  3  4 
Dual-agent deals  -0.071** 
( 0.027) 
  -0.070** 
( 0.027) 
 
Within-agency deals  -0.085** 
( 0.028) 
  -0.084** 
( 0.028) 
 




  -0.076** 
( 0.022) 






Within R-square  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.18 
N  10,891  10,891  10,891  10,891 
 
+ Significant at 0.10; * Significant at 0.05; ** Significant at 0.01.  
Standard errors, clustered by agent, are in parentheses. 
 All regressions include all house characteristics (X1) and seller agent, seller agency, and 
zip code-year fixed effects (X2), as described in section 5.1.  
 
 
Table 7: Assessing The Likelihood of Dual Agency in Short And Long Deals 
 
Time-to-sale (in days)  
(overall mean = 83.11) 
<=14   <=21   <=30   >=120   >=180   >=240  
Proportion of dual agency deals  
(Overall mean=0.47) 
0.62  0.55  0.51  0.46  0.45  0.44 
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Table 8: The Relationship Between Sale Price, List Price And Dual Agency On Fast-
Closing Deals (A Test of Strategic Pricing) 
 
Estimation method: OLS 
 





































0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
N  1165  1165  1165  1165 
+ Significant at 0.10; * Significant at 0.05; ** Significant at 0.01.  
Standard errors, clustered by agent, are in parentheses. 
All regressions include all house characteristics (X1) and seller agent, seller agency, and 
zip code-year fixed effects (X2), as described in section 5.1. All regressions only include 
houses that sold in 21 days or less. 
 
 
 